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DOCTORS & SOCIETY
The contractual model of the patient-physician
relationship and the demise of medical professionalism
The contractual model of the patient-
physician relationship
In the previous discussion of the patient-physician
relationship (PPR),1 the ‘informative’/‘engineering’
model was said to assume that doctors have exclusive
access to medical ‘facts’, and patients to personal
values and preferences, thus justifying unfettered
patient autonomy in medical decision-making. This
complete separation of the fact-value dichotomy has
had the unfortunate consequence of contributing to
the commercialisation of modern medicine, in which
doctors are seen as service providers/contractors (or
salesmen/saleswomen of medical expertise), patients
as consumers shopping for medical goods, and the
PPR as nothing more than a business or contractual
relationship.2
In a modern libertarian society, contractual rela-
tionships cover a wide range of human transactions
and interactions in which equal parties agree freely
and voluntarily as autonomous agents on particular
undertakings with specific interests, purposes, and
goals in mind. In private medical practice where
doctors retain more control over the type, scope,
location, and conditions of practice, the contractual
nature of the PPR is readily visible. However, even in
a non-private setting where there is no specific agree-
ment in place, by convention, whenever a doctor un-
dertakes to treat or care for a patient, he or she is held
in law to have implicitly contracted with the patient,
and the physician’s subsequent conduct is governed
by the ‘implied contract’ to render care according to
certain pre-established standards.3,4 Hence, common
law often assumes the contractual model as the
starting point for analysis of tort duties in a PPR,5 and
such an approach is not without advantages. Firstly,
by infusing a strong sense of equality, symmetry, and
mutuality into the PPR, the contractual model
undermines the traditionally more authoritarian
(eg priestly or parental) models. Secondly, since a
contract is driven by the interests and goals of the
contracting parties, and each party ‘uses’ the contract
to his or her own ends and advantages, it removes
the overbearing element of philanthropy or ‘condes-
cension of charity’ often displayed by doctors in a
PPR. Finally, by providing or referring to explicit
contractual terms that are legally enforceable, the
model affords formal protection for parties in a
PPR. But a contractual PPR has far more vices than
virtues, and it is to some of the key limitations we
now turn.
The contractual model is inadequate to
describe the complexities of the patient-
physician relationship
In ordinary commercial applications, contractual
relationships are relatively simple, eg a property lease.
In contrast, PPRs are complex, both externally and
internally. Unlike simple commercial contracts, PPRs
are subject to many social and institutional forces
external to and uncontrolled by parties constituting a
PPR. These may come from government health care
policies, professional codes of ethics, legal statutes,
institutional/peer pressure, insurance/co-payment
schemes, family/cultural traditions, personal values,
religious allegiances, etc, and they all impinge on the
PPR by adding complexities and constraints. The PPR
is also intrinsically complex because patients and
doctors are not ‘contracted’ as conventional buyers
and sellers. Firstly, patients hardly ‘voluntarily
consent’ to ‘purchase’ health care in the same way
customers agree to buy a car. The need to ‘purchase’
medical care is unwelcome and it often arises in
acute or emergency situations that do not allow enough
time to conduct a careful market analysis of available
medical services, even if this were possible. Secondly,
doctors have an almost complete monopoly on the
‘merchandise’ patients need, and the bargaining power
of patients is more like that between an individual
and a public utility rather than that of a potential
car buyer in a car dealership.6 Thirdly, the PPR is a
personal and intimate relationship in which one
party, the patient, is a sick, vulnerable, dependent,
and helpless person whose “illness is inherently
degrading and dehumanizing, and… exposes and
threatens the sick person’s body, soul, and intimate
relationships.”7 In contrast, the other party, the doctor,
is confident, independent, equipped with superior
knowledge and skills, and socially superior. In short,
there is a significant asymmetry in power, knowledge,
and status in a PPR. Finally, in order for doctors to
provide treatment, patients often have to expose
the body, and reluctantly divulge personal/family
information to their doctors that is otherwise held
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with the strictest confidentiality. In other words, a PPR
is a project much more involved than the purchase
of merchandise or services to cure a disease. With
all its imbalances and asymmetries, the PPR exists
to ‘re-humanise’ sick persons who are not only
threatened bodily, but for whom all of the values
that the person stands for are being endangered. This
complex and intimately personal ‘medical transaction’
far exceeds what the contractual model can describe
or accommodate.
The contractual model is inadequate to
regulate the patient-physician relationship
Contracts may be very efficient in regulating the
arms-length commercial dealings that occur in
conventional buyer/seller relationships, but they are
particularly deficient when it comes to the complexi-
ties of the PPR. Parties in a commercial contract
are ultimately motivated by self-interest, and each
is expected to protect oneself from the other’s self-
interested behaviour. This means that the interests
of contracting parties are potentially in conflict, and
the relationship is potentially adversarial in nature.
This is alarmingly unfair for a PPR, where one party
is a vulnerable patient and the other a powerful, if not
seemingly omnipotent doctor. In recent times, under
the influence of the contractual model, patients have
been called ‘clients’ and physicians ‘providers’—terms
not only empty of all the connotations of the terms
‘patient’ and ‘doctor’, respectively, but also suggest-
ing that providers/physicians and clients/patients
only need to oblige each other with a minimal market-
place morality, eg prohibition of fraud and coercion,
in much the same way automobile mechanics are
obliged to their customers. Such a contractual/
commercial PPR is too ill-equipped and impoverished
to ensure that patients receive fair treatment.
Furthermore, within the PPR, doctors must deal with
patients in the midst of sickness, crimes, or tragedies,
and their conditions are by nature unpredictable.
There is no way to precisely and exhaustively specify
patients’ medical needs in advance, and doctors must
be willing to cope with contingencies. They may be
called upon to perform services that exceed those
that could be specified in a contract or for which they
may not be compensated. As well, doctors cannot
unilaterally withdraw from their contracted responsi-
bilities (explicit or implied) unless they are prepared
to be charged with patient abandonment. But the
contractual model of the PPR encourages a minimalism
that “reduces everything to tit-for-tat: do no more for
your patients than what the contract calls for; perform
specified services for certain fees and no more” and
produces doctors “too grudging, too calculating, too
lacking in spontaneity, too quickly exhausted to go
the second mile with [their] patients along the road
of their distress….”8 In sum, the nature of the PPR
and society’s expectations of the medical profession
far exceed the regulatory function of a commercial
contract, and law courts, rightly, do not always judge
doctors’ obligations solely based on contract law
analysis.9
The contractual model does not nurture
or sustain medical professionalism and
ethics
The most devastating effect of a commercial view of
medicine and a contractual model of the PPR is to
cause doctors to become amnesic of the ‘professional
promise’ they have collectively made to society. This
professional promise of service and commitment is in
reciprocity to society’s generous gifts of support,
financial or otherwise, to train people to become
doctors, to build hospitals for doctors to practise their
profession in, to permit them to practice and perfect
their skills on patients, and to establish the medical
profession as an exclusive body of experts with a
monopoly of practice and an elevated social status. In
return, a ‘professional promise’ is made that doctors
will be obligated to preserve and protect the health
and well-being of all members of the society. To breach
this promise indicates that doctors have unconscion-
ably removed from their collective memory their
enormous indebtedness to society and the patients
who have enabled them to become and to remain
doctors. Commercial/marketplace medicine and
contractual PPRs are morally unprofessional and
unacceptable because they assume that doctors do
not owe any duties to society and patients. Doctors,
in turn, are encouraged to believe that they become
doctors solely because of their superior intellectual
qualities, and their professional commitment to
patients as practising doctors is due to their personal
virtues of philanthropy or altruism. They mistakenly
assume that their acts of healing and caring are
entirely gratuitous and charitable, when in reality
all of their professional activities should be seen
as discharging their prior indebtedness to society
and its citizens for having provided them with their
professional education, practice, and status. Profes-
sional membership is both a gift from society and
a promise by doctors, and the moral foundation of
medical professionalism is based on society’s
generosity and doctors’ gratitude, marked by ele-
ments of gift, exchange, indebtedness, and recipro-
city. This mandates an ethical model of the PPR
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that is considerably more sensitive and responsive
to the social definition of the medical profession
than a commercial contract. The understanding of
the PPR in purely commercial/contractual terms is a
flashing amber light that warns of the impending moral
bankruptcy of the medical profession in our times.
EC Hui, MD, PhD
(e-mail: edwinhui@hku.hk)
Medical Ethics Unit
Faculty of Medicine
University of Hong Kong
Pokfulam, Hong Kong
References
1. EC Hui. The centrality of patient-physician relationship to
medical professionalism: an ethical evaluation of some
contemporary models. Hong Kong Med J 2005;11:222-3.
2. Veatch RM. Models for ethical medicine in a revolutionary
age. What physician-patient roles foster the most ethical
relationship? Hastings Cent Rep 1972;2:5-7.
3. Tom LB, James FC. Principles of biomedical ethics. New
York: Oxford University Press; 1994:195-7.
4. Kennedy I, Grubb A. Medical law. 3rd ed. London:
Butterworths; 2000:272-7.
5. Masters RD. Is contract an adequate basis for medical
ethics? Hastings Cent Rep 1975;5:24-8.
6. Furrow BR. Forcing rescue: the landscape of health care
provider obligations to treat patients. J Law Med 1993;3:40.
7. Kass L. Toward a more natural science: biology and human
affairs. New York: Free Press; 1985:222.
8. May WF. Code, covenant, contract, or philanthropy. Hastings
Cent Rep 1975;5:29-38.
9. Kennedy I, Grubb A. Medical law. 3rd ed. London:
Butterworths; 2000:7.
Answers to CME Programme
Hong Kong Medical Journal
August 2005 issue
Hong Kong Med J 2005;11:243-50
I. Chromosomal abnormalities and FMR1 gene premutation in Chinese women with
premature menopause
A 1. False 2. True 3. True 4. False 5. True
B 1. False 2. False 3. True 4. True 5. True
Hong Kong Med J 2005;11:251-8
II. Medullary thyroid carcinoma in Hong Kong Chinese patients
A 1. True 2. False 3. True 4. True 5. False
B 1. True 2. True 3. False 4. True 5. True
